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BOOK REVIEW
UNMASKING JUDICIAL EXTREMISM
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA. By Cass R. Sunstein, NEW YORK, N.Y.:
BASIC BOOKS. 2005. 252 pp. $16.95.

Reviewed by Carl Tobias

*

INTRODUCTION
Professor Cass Sunstein has long been an incisive and provocative legal scholar. Students of constitutional law, the modern administrative state, and contemporary political science-as well as
numerous other fields ranging from cost-benefit analysis to punitive damages-eagerly anticipate the release of his work. Sunstein's monograph, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing
Courts Are Wrong for America, continues this tradition. He exquisitely timed the book as attention recently focused on two Supreme Court vacancies after a protracted hiatus. 1 Rarely have the
Justices been so divided over major substantive and interpretive
questions, and rarely has such ferment permeated constitutional
law. Indeed, Professor Laurence Tribe peremptorily announced
that he was discontinuing work on the renowned treatise, American Constitutional Law, because the scholar could not organize
and rationalize the divergent areas. 2

* Copyright Carl Tobias, 2009. Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of
Law. I wish to thank Paul Catanese, Scott Jones, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions; Tammy Longest for processing this piece; and Russell Williams for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2005, § 1, at 1.
2. See Letter from Laurence Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Univ., to
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These ideas make the publication of Radicals in Robes timely
and warrant the volume's review. This piece undertakes that effort. Part I descriptively assesses the monograph. Part II scrutinizes the myriad valuable insights Sunstein contributes to readers' appreciation of modem constitutional law and the Supreme
Court. The review concludes by offering a few suggestions.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The introduction, "The Constitution in Exile," analyzes how
certain judges, scholars, and politicians contend that, because
America has a written Constitution, jurists who faithfully read
the document must '"illuminate the meaning of the text as the
Framers understood it.'"3 Some believe the Justices abandoned
the text in the 1930s by finding that the Commerce Clause is a
broad delegation, which Congress used to grant agencies wide
discretion. 4 The Court also ostensibly "blinked away" core Bill of
Rights provisions-namely the "Takings Clause"-and fashioned
rights, such as privacy, not mentioned in the document. 5 Those
observers urge greater textual fidelity by emphasizing the original meaning and, thus, restoration of the "real" Constitution, the
document in exile. 6 Sunstein finds very troubling that numerous
''judges-radicals in robes, fundamentalists on the bench"attempt to transform the Constitution, basically reinstituting the
much earlier version, or perhaps converting it to the more extreme views of the Republican Party. 7
Sunstein explains that court appointments necessarily mean
that the Constitution's interpretation will change over time. Republicans have favored judges who would alter Warren Court jurisprudence, making the former center the left and the prior far
right the center, while eliminating what had been the left. Illustrative is Justice John Paul Stevens, whose views have essentially remained unchanged, even as the Court's gravity center has
Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 29, 2005), in
Laurence Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (Spring 2005).
3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 4 (2005) (quoting Douglas H. Ginsburg, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Remarks at the University of Chicago Law School).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 6-7.
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shifted. 8 Sunstein concedes that the Justices have rejected some
extreme modifications, as judges generally follow precedent, yet
warns that a few doctrinaire appointments could prompt more
radical change, voicing special concern about the "close fit between [extremists'] own political commitments and the Constitution itself."9
Part One, "The Great Divide,'' has two chapters. 10 The first defines and explores relevant interpretive schools. One school is the
"fundamentalism" described above. 11 Because its proponents appreciate that constitutional doctrine now reflects other perspectives, they seek large-scale alterations through broad, clear
rules. 12 The second school is "minimalism,'' which treats constitutional law as a "series of incompletely theorized agreements"
whereby judges accept a particular view on doctrines, such as
equality, without subscribing to its deepest foundations. 13 Minimalists concomitantly respect precedent because it vitiates the
need to answer the most basic questions presented by new issues
and fosters stability, though they prefer narrow disposition and
resolving one case at a time. 14 Thus, minimalism comprises a method and a restraint while it is neither a program nor a mandate
for specific results. 15 Sunstein asserts that modern constitutional
disputes are best understood vis-a-vis the split between this idea
and fundamentalism which, for instance, dominates the most critical debates within the High Court and Senate judicial confirmation fights. 16
Other views do exist. "Perfectionism" holds that judges should
make the Constitution as good as possible by interpreting its capacious, general phrasing so as to cast the document's "ideals in
the best possible light." 17 For example, when precedent leaves
gaps or ambiguities, jurists should attempt to improve the law.
Justices William Brennan and William Douglas, who lack succes-

8. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6, at 50.
9. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 19.
10. Id. at 23-78.
11. See id. at 25.
12. See id. at 26-27.
13. Id. at 28.
14. See id. at 28-29.
15. Id. at 29.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 32.
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sors on the present Court, are illustrative. 18 The fourth approach,
"non-partisan restraint" or "majoritarianism," champions deference to the elected branches-unless their actions clearly violate
the Constitution-because judges are fallible and a powerful judiciary could injure democracy. 19 Sunstein finds that no sitting Justice is a committed majoritarian. 20
"Each position is vulnerable to coalitions of the other three,"
but minimalism and fundamentalism now dominate constitutional thought. 21 Sunstein emphasizes the latter in chapter two. "History's Dead Hand" shows how fundamentalists endorse "originalist" interpretations and assesses ways that the fundamentalists'
approach could threaten democracy and jeopardize Americans'
rights by freezing the Constitution as of 1787. 22
The second part, "Great Divisions," canvasses quite a few important modern constitutional issues, such as affirmative action,
national security, privacy, and separation of powers. 23 Sunstein
demonstrates how applying the theories of construction yields
particular results in specific doctrinal areas. For instance, he considers fundamentalism overbroad and retrogressive while asserting that minimalism takes a rather incremental and progressive
approach. 24
II.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Sunstein offers numerous cogent insights. Most significant, he
descriptively analyzes four main interpretive schools and how
they resolve constitutional disputes today while explaining why
minimalism is preferable and fundamentalism is incorrect and
even dangerous. Considerable previous research has assessed individual cases, doctrinal modifications, and emerging trends;
however, Radicals in Robes is one of the best new treatments.
Sunstein painstakingly documents relevant historical phenomena, evaluates and imposes a salutary conceptual framework on

18. Id.
19. See id. at 48-50.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Id. at 50-51.
22. See id. at 53-78.
23. See id. at 81-252.
24. See id. at 108-09 (discussing the difference between the minimalists' and the fundamentalists' approaches to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade).
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major opinions, identifies crucial jurisprudential and political
linkages, and astutely elucidates how the whole is often more
than the sum of its parts.
The remarkable detail and clarity with which Sunstein explores the four dominant positions are instructive. Sunstein reviews the approaches' backgrounds and philosophical foundations, their contemporary relevance, and the schools' benefits and
disadvantages. The writer shows that majoritarianism and perfectionism are distinguished historical views with little representation on the current bench. Now, minimalism enjoys substantial
public and judicial support while fundamentalism is ascendanta juxtaposition which prompts their comparison. Sunstein advocates minimalism, contending that it respects the elected
branches through allowance for democratic self-government and
recognizes judges' limited role by favoring incremental court decisions and opposing expansive judicial power.
Telling are Sunstein's criticisms of fundamentalism that would
freeze the Constitution as it was when it was ratified, as jurists
must construe the document in accordance with original intent.
This, Sunstein contends, would eviscerate Americans' democracy
and rights by undermining political-branch authority and many
of the freedoms that citizens now enjoy. Sunstein describes how
the idea fosters horizontal accretion in courts of power formerly
held by the elected branches, shifts authority's prior vertical balance to the states away from the federal government, and constricts legislation that safeguards Americans' rights. For example, the author denigrates the recent judicial narrowing of
Congress's "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,"25 the
Fourteenth Amendment and shows that treating the Justices, rather than lawmakers, as propriety's arbiters is an invention
based on miscomprehension of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which simultaneously undercuts legislative authority to protect citizens and expands judicial power. 26

25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5.
26. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 240-41; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that the patent laws
that "abrogated the States sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement" could
"not be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that Congress
exceeded its power when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
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Sunstein disparages the Justices' similar restriction of congressional authority to pass laws under the Commerce Clause and
shows that making the Justices, not Congress, judges of "effects"
on commerce is basically a fiction premised on the clause's misapprehension, which undermines legislative power-especially
to safeguard the public-and increases judicial authority. 27 Both
the Section 5 and Commerce Clause interpretations, which suggest that evidentiary records underlie statutes' passage and imply that the Court's decisional methods are better than lawmaking
procedures, 28 have no constitutional underpinning. Sunstein criticizes the Justices' analogous determination that federal authority
cannot support particular legislation because it commandeers
states under the Tenth Amendment or invades their sovereignty
under the Eleventh. 29 He also shows that the ways certain Justices read Section 5 and the Commerce Clause, as well as invoke the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, epitomize how fundamentalists betray the commitment to originalism when historical evidence yields undesirable results or even ignore the applicable history, suggesting that they favor partisan ideology, not law. 30
Sunstein's clarification of the rhetoric which suffuses much discourse about the Constitution and the Justices is similarly efficacious. For instance, Sunstein finds woefully insufficient the description of constitutional battles as fights between liberal and
conservative ideology, even while showing how much the Court
has drifted rightward, using Justices, namely William Rehnquist
and John Paul Stevens, as foils, and the Court's gravity shift,
which eliminated the left. He also suggests the inherent deficiencies of employing ''judicial activism," observing that this phenomenon is frequently manifested on the spectrum's conservative as
well as its liberal end. 31

27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 240-41.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 235-41. As to the Tenth Amendment, see Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). As to the Eleventh Amendment, see Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 634-35, and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999).
30. "Too much of the time, fundamentalists read the Constitution not to fit the original understanding but the views of the extreme wing of [the) Republican Party."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 244.
31. See id. at 41-44.
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Sunstein's astute critique should also reach a wide audience.
Despite the complexity intrinsic to the theoretical, political, and
constitutional questions evaluated-as well as the obscure nature
of the judicial decisions and interpretative approaches reviewedhis clear, thorough explication and informal, often colloquial,
style will facilitate this work's broad dissemination. Attorneys
and law students will easily comprehend the volume, but a multitude of readers without legal training should find the book accessible and instructive.
Sunstein's incisive perspectives have greater force because
their exponent is a legal scholar who certain observers might assume would favor perfectionism. He trenchantly criticizes this
view and fundamentalism in essence for analogous reasons,
namely that both sacrifice practicality to absolutism. Sunstein
espouses minimalism because the approach respects federal
elected-branch prerogatives, contemplates a narrow judicial role,
and favors incremental change.
Ill. SUGGESTIONS

Despite Sunstein's many insightful contributions, I can posit
several constructive ideas. Elaborating a few notions would improve appreciation of present constitutional disputes and the Supreme Court. For example, knowing that fundamentalism may at
once erode American democracy and citizens' rights is valuable.
Equally useful would be more consideration of how it affects horizontal power distribution given each administration's tendency to
claim greater authority, particularly vis-a-vis Congress. It may
also be beneficial to identify the vertical effects of such power distribution. National power's devolution to the states-a central
fundamentalist tenet-may be anachronistic, and even dangerous, during a time of international crises, especially considering
the upheaval fostered by world terrorism. Detailing the horizontal and vertical impacts may correspondingly elucidate modern
American debates, such as the preferable governmental branch
and level for treating complex societal issues, namely crime, natural disasters, and the tensions between national security and
civil liberty. All this information would help policymakers and citizens decide whether increasing judicial power at the expense of
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the other branches and states' authority vis-a-vis the federal government advantages the country as matters of structure, power,
and citizen rights and, if not, how to alter those trends.
Sunstein also might have explained precisely how minimalism
applies to specific past, current, and future issues. One general
illustration is the Court's privacy decisions, which trace their
modern lineage to Griswold u. Connecticut. 32 Particular examples
are the questions of reproductive freedom that involve Roe u.
Wade 33 and its progeny; gay rights as implicated by Lawrence u.
Texas; 34 and equal protection, critical to the Court's decisions in
Brown u. Board of Education, 35 Grutter u. Bollinger, 36 and Baker
u. Carr, 37 which involves reapportionment, the "thickest thicket."38
Minimalism could place greater trust in elected officials than history warrants, as the desegregation and reapportionment cases
show. Modern constitutional theory and law, evidenced by footnote four in Carolene Products and numerous precedents, concomitantly hold that an integral judicial function is protecting minority rights from majoritarian tyranny. 39
These concerns do not detract from Sunstein's valuable contributions. However, he might have reviewed a few areas explicitly
or with increased specificity, derived additional lessons from fundamentalism's rise, and offered more suggestions for rectifying or
ameliorating the present circumstances. It would be helpful to
have additional views from an expert observer who has so meticulously scrutinized constitutional interpretation, the Supreme
Court, separation of powers, federalism, and politics. For instance, Sunstein might have assessed the effects of campaign
finance regimes, legislative reapportionment schemes, and incumbency's power on the phenomena he analyzes, as well as how
the unelected judiciary, the least democratic branch, has ironically become the greatest moderating force in the national arena.

32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007),
and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
37. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
38. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
39. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Thus, Radicals in Robes may be profitably compared with new
works by other students of constitutional interpretation and the
High Court, namely Justice Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty, 40
Professor Jeffrey Rosen's The Most Democratic Branch, 41 Professor Mark Tushnet's A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court, 42 and
ABC Supreme Court Correspondent Jan Crawford Greenburg's
Supreme Confiict. 43 These ideas are particularly salient when
controversial and powerfully held views about the best ways to
interpret the Constitution, protect citizens' rights, appoint judges,
distribute governmental authority, and correspondingly preserve
horizontal and vertical structural integrity suffuse modern debate.
CONCLUSION

Radicals in Robes substantially advances understanding of
modern constitutional interpretation and the Supreme Court,
particularly by showing how fundamentalism's ascension might
undermine democracy and citizen rights. Sunstein illuminates
this jurisprudential approach's revitalization, its deleterious impacts, and a salutary response in the form of a preferable
theory-minimalism. That concept accords the elected branches
greater respect while it better protects citizens' rights and limits
judicial power.

40. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
41. JEFFERY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA (2006).
42. MARK TuSHNET, A COURT DMDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE F'UTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005).
43. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007).

